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COURTING SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY:
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW IN INDIA†
DEEPTI SHENOY*
Learned men see with an equal eye
a scholarly and dignified priest,
a cow, an elephant, a dog,
and even an outcaste scavenger.1
1.

INTRODUCTION

Inequality in India is made particularly pervasive by the fact
that India’s rigid social hierarchies are intertwined with
longstanding quasi-religious principles.2 Notwithstanding the fact
that equality, based on the intrinsic divinity of all beings, is a
principle inherent to Hinduism3—the country’s dominant religion,
India has long been defined by a strict system of social
stratification legitimated by perceived cultural and religious
principles.4

† Winner, 2012 Louis Jackson Memorial Student Writing Competition in
Employment and Labor Law.
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2013; B.A. Santa Clara
University, 2009. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Aditi Bagchi at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School for her encouragement and insights. I
would also like to thank my parents, Sushma and Pradeep Shenoy, for their
support and assistance, and Jon Dueltgen, for his perspective on American labor
law. All remaining shortcomings are attributable to me alone.
1 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA: KRISHNA’S COUNSEL IN TIME OF WAR 59 (Barbara Stoler
Miller trans., 1986).
2 Vikraman Nair, The Search for Equality Through Constitutional Process: The
Indian Experience, 2001 ACTA JURIDICA 255, 256 (2001) (“Religious tenets, scriptures
and even customs were distorted and manipulated and were used to
institutionalise, justify and perpetuate . . . oppression and subordination [by race
and caste].”).
3 Id. at 255; see also THE BHAGAVAD-GITA, supra note 1, at 67 (“I exist in all
creatures, so the disciplined man devoted to me grasps the oneness of life . . . .”).
4 Nair, supra note 2, at 256.
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The hierarchies that define Indian society bear upon every
aspect of life.5 In the realm of employment, hierarchical norms
define the types of occupations into which a person might enter, as
well as the conditions of employment she may expect to
encounter.6 Many industries remain de facto segregated by caste
and gender.7 Prejudice often operates at a surface level, and a
certain level of classification by social status is the norm rather
than the exception.8
Since employment discrimination in India is primarily the
result of structural inequalities that assign a subordinate social
status to women and disadvantaged minority groups, the problem
is best addressed through a systemic approach that attacks the
underlying hierarchies directly.9 A substantive conception of
equality is enshrined in India’s Constitution, which directs the
state to take affirmative action to empower women and
disadvantaged minorities to compete, on more equal terms, with

5 CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CASTE
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS OR SO-CALLED UNTOUCHABLES IN INDIA 54 (2007),
available at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/chrgj-hrw.pdf
[hereinafter CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS] (discussing, inter alia, labor
and employment rights to work, the right to form and join trade unions, housing
and property rights, the right to access services in a non-discriminatory manner,
education rights, and the right to equal participation in cultural activities); Sumita
Ray, The Women’s Reservation Bill of India: A Political Movement Towards Equality for
Women, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 53, 53 (1999) (discussing labor and
employment and other rights in the gender context).
6 CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 55; SURINDER
MEDIRATTA, HANDBOOK OF LAW, WOMEN, AND EMPLOYMENT: POLICIES, ISSUES,
LEGISLATION, AND CASE LAW 2 (2009) (noting the persistence of gender inequality
in India despite the egalitarian provisions in the Indian Constitution and the
implementation of myriad International Law Organization conventions and
recommendations).
7 CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 55 (“Dalit’s talents,
merits, and hard work are of little consequence in a system where occupational
status is determined by birth.”); see also MEDIRATTA, supra note 6, at 17 (observing
that female mobility into managerial positions is extremely limited).
8 Smita Narula, Equal by Law, Unequal by Caste: The “Untouchable” Condition in
Critical Race Perspective, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 255, 260 (2008) (contrasting
discrimination against Dalits with the South African apartheid system).
9 Sean A. Pager, Anti-Subordination of Whom? What India’s Answer Tells Us
About the Meaning of Equality in Affirmative Action, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 329
(2007) (contrasting caste-based discrimination in India with the “irrational
prejudice” against an immutable trait such as skin color that underlies racism in
the United States).
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members of more privileged social groups.10 The government has
been guided by this constitutionally-sanctioned substantive
impetus and has implemented a system of “compensatory
discrimination” in the form of quotas for women and members of
disadvantaged castes in government jobs.11 In taking a primarily
substantive, rather than formal, approach to equality, India rightly
recognizes that neutral application of laws and policies will
perpetuate the subordination of already disadvantaged groups.12
Given the salience of social hierarchies in the Indian context,
disadvantaged minorities contend with near insurmountable
barriers to availing themselves of opportunity.
Despite its commitment to substantive equality, India’s existing
approach to employment discrimination has fallen short of its
egalitarian ideals.13 One explanation for this shortfall is the lack of
a comprehensive employment discrimination framework

10 M. Varn Chandola, Affirmative Action in India and the United States: The
Untouchable and Black Experience, 3 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 101, 105-07 (1992)
(noting that the “compensatory discrimination” provisions of the Indian
Constitution permit unequal treatment based on “reasonable classifications”
aimed at remedying social ills); see also INDIA CONST. art. 16, § 4 (“Nothing in this
article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of
appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the
opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the
State.”).
11 Nair, supra note 2, at 258 (noting, also, quota systems in legislatures, higher
education, land and housing allotment, health care, scholarships, grants, and legal
aid). Compensatory discrimination “is a daring attempt to remedy past injustices
suffered by those who are at the lower levels of India’s four-tier caste hierarchy.”
E.J. Prior, Constitutional Fairness or Fraud on the Constitution? Compensatory
Discrimination in India, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 63, 65-66 (1996).
12 See Manuela Tomei, Discrimination and Equality at Work: A Review of the
Concepts, 142 INT’L LAB. REV. 401, 411 (2003) (“[C]onsistent treatment of different
people may produce unequal results.”); see also Narula, supra note 8, at 314
(observing that “there are no objective standards of merit applicable to all groups
within society, given that dominant groups shape traditions within which they
make judgments of merit”).
13 See Takahiro Ito, Caste Discrimination and Transaction Costs in the Labor
Market: Evidence From Rural North India, 88 J. DEV. ECON. 292, 299 (2009) (observing
that India’s reservation-based approach to employment discrimination has had
limited impact); see also Sukhadeo Thorat & Paul Attewell, The Legacy of Social
Exclusion: A Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India, 42 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 4141, 4144 (2007) (highlighting the high incidence of caste discrimination in
the relatively unregulated Indian private sector); Geeta Gandhi Kingdon & Jeemol
Unni, Education and Women’s Labour Market Outcomes in India, 9 EDUC. ECON. 173,
173 (2001) (“[W]omen do suffer high levels of wage discrimination in the Indian
urban labour market . . . .”).
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adequately addressing the myriad of ways discrimination operates.
The existing legal protections against such discrimination include
constitutional provisions mandating equality14 and a handful of
scattered criminal statutes. There is no umbrella employment
discrimination statute to regulate private sector workplaces in
India.15 Reservations, constituting the primary means by which the
government addresses employment discrimination, do not extend
to the private or agricultural sectors. This is highly problematic,
given the fact that these sectors together encompass the lion’s share
of the workforce.16 The existing statutory provisions provide some
measure of protection to women in the private sector workforce,
but many of these do not address caste discrimination.
The social affliction engendered by entrenched hierarchies is
exacerbated by the hesitance of the legislative and executive
branches of government to take action beyond the existing system
of quotas to benefit disadvantaged minorities.17 Compensatory
discrimination has become a highly politicized endeavor, with
various political parties vying for the support of caste-based
interest groups.18 In the process, influential members of nominally
disadvantaged groups are unfairly benefited and the interests of
the genuinely underprivileged are neglected.19
The Indian Supreme Court has attempted to fill the void
created by the legislature’s abdication of responsibility.20 Since the
late 1970s, the Court has adopted an increasingly activist posture in

INDIA CONST. arts. 14–16.
See Anti-Discrimination/Sex Equality, LAWYERS COLLECTIVE, http://www.
lawyerscollective.org/womens-rights-initiative/anti-discriminationsex-equality.
html (last visited May 3, 2013) (“There is no comprehensive anti-discrimination
code in India although there are laws that address specific aspects related to
equality.”).
16 See S. Sakthivel & Pinaki Joddar, Unorganised Sector Workforce in India:
Trends, Patterns and Social Security Coverage, 41 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2107, 2108–10
(2006) (noting that approximately 92 percent of India’s workforce is employed in
the unorganized sector, which accounts for nearly the entire agricultural
workforce [with the exception of plantation workers] and the vast majority of the
private sector workforce. Only approximately 8 percent of the workforce is
employed in the organized sector, encompassing the whole of the public sector
workforce and the organized portion of the private sector).
17 Avani Mehta Sood, Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case
Studies From India, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 833, 845 (2008).
18 Pager, supra note 9, at 338.
19 Id.
20 Sood, supra note 17, at 844.
14
15
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an effort to uphold the rights of the disadvantaged.21 Yet despite
the Court’s commitment to substantive equality, it has not been
wholly immune from the regressive, traditional norms that
pervade Indian society.22
The Court has also selectively
superimposed formal equality principles on a vision of substantive
equality colored by traditional norms, an approach that has at
times yielded unsatisfactory results.23 The Apex Court’s occasional
reliance on traditional stereotypes has sometimes had the effect of
calcifying social hierarchies.24
While the entrenched hierarchies that undergird Indian society
necessitate a substantive approach to equality that takes into
account the painfully real social differences that limit access to
opportunity for certain groups, India’s substantive approach has
hitherto failed to generate the anticipated results. The deficiencies
in India’s approach to substantive equality are the lack of a
comprehensive framework addressing employment discrimination
in its various forms and the selective intermingling of formal and
substantive equality with traditional norms. This article argues,
therefore, that India’s commitment to equality in employment
would be better realized through (1) a comprehensive employment
discrimination framework, which would ease the litigation burden
on disadvantaged victims, offer a wider range of remedies than
those currently available under the constitution and criminal laws,
and extend the protections of employment equality further than
the limited sphere to which they currently apply and (2) a strong
commitment to a primarily substantive approach, disentangled

Id. at 837.
See Jeremy Sarkin & Mark Koenig, Ending Caste Discrimination in India:
Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Individuals and Groups from
Discrimination at the Domestic and International Levels, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
541, 558–59 (2010) (describing the Indian Supreme Court’s reliance on traditional
caste identities in reaching some of its judgments).
23 See, e.g., Javed v. Haryana, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3057 (India) (upholding a law
that prevented men and women with more than two children from serving in
municipal governments, despite clear evidence that this disproportionately
burdened and disqualified women, because it was not “arbitrary, unreasonable,
or discriminatory”); see also Sood, supra note 17, at 888 (quoting Supreme Court
Justice Ruma Pal as observing, “[t]he most frequent judicial failures to
conceptualize the offence arise when the Court approaches the issue with certain
judicial predispositions, based on either class or gender”).
24 Kalpana Kannabiran, Judicial Meanderings in Patriarchal Thickets: Litigating
Sex Discrimination in India, 44 ECON & POL. WKLY. 88, 90 (2009).
21
22
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from formal equality and free from the regressive effects of
traditional stereotypes.
2.

HIERARCHIES

Perhaps the most visible of India’s social hierarchies, the caste
system, divides Hindus into four classes, called varnas: the
Brahmins (priests), the Kshatriyas (warriors), the Vaishyas
(businesspeople), and the Shudras (laborers), in order of
descending authority.25 Below the caste system lies a fifth group,
the Dalits, or scheduled castes, who have historically been
subjugated through their perceived untouchability, whereby
contact with them has been viewed as inauspicious and polluting.26
Within the larger varnas are various subcastes, or jatis, which vary
from one region to another and which have, over the course of
time, dictated the occupations into which a person might enter.27
The caste system is a complex social code, which, as per tradition,
governs all aspects of human interaction, with the upper castes
exercising considerable subjugating influence over the lower castes
and those below the caste system.28 The almost total absence of
intermarriage across castes reinforces these social divisions.29 The
system is one of graded inequality, a factor that has significantly
contributed to its continuing relevance because of the incentive it
provides at each level to maintain the status quo.30 Thus, certain
jatis among the Dalits, for instance those involved in the practice of
manual scavenging or the cleaning of dry latrines, are viewed as
untouchables even among the Dalits.31
No less significant in Indian society is the hierarchy that
separates men from women and draws for legitimacy upon
gendered cultural values purportedly rooted in religious
25 Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 22, at 547 (identifying and describing the caste
divisions in India).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Priya Sridharan, Representations of Disadvantage: Evolving Definitions of
Disadvantage in India’s Reservation Policy and United States’ Affirmative Action Policy,
6 ASIAN L.J. 99, 102 (1999) (describing the caste system as a way of organizing
Indian society).
29 Narula, supra note 8, at 276 (“Prohibitions on inter-marriage are not only a
hallmark feature of the caste system . . . but are essential to maintaining its very
existence.”).
30 Id. at 260.
31 CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 56.
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doctrine.32 Traditional conceptions of women as being primarily
suited to domestic roles have restricted the roles that women, in
particular, those of the upper castes, have played in the public
sphere.33 Women who enter the workforce must overcome
significant hurdles at every step of the way, from contending with
familial and societal expectations that they remain in the domestic
sphere to facing discrimination in all aspects of employment.34
Women of the lower castes are particularly vulnerable due to their
position at the intersection of caste and sex discrimination.35 These
women account for the majority of those engaged in what are
viewed as the most dangerous and degrading occupations and face
significant opposition to any attempts on their part to empower
themselves.36
Inequality in India is particularly problematic because of the
scale on which it occurs and its tendency to dominate all aspects of
32 See A.P. THAKUR & SUNIL PANDEY, 21ST CENTURY INDIA: VIEW AND VISION 132
(2009) (observing that, in the Indian social structure, “[m]en outrank women of
the same or similar age . . . .”). For an example of the ways in which religious
gender hierarchies bear upon the Indian system of laws, see Kamala Sankaran,
Special Provisions and Access to Socio-Economic Rights: Women and the Indian
Constitution, 23 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 277, 285 (2007) (describing Indian courts’
widespread practice of upholding sex discrimination that falls under the purview
of so-called religious personal laws).
33 KARIN KAPADIA, Translocal Modernities and Transformations of Gender and
Caste, in THE VIOLENCE OF DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY, GENDER AND
SOCIAL INEQUALITIES IN INDIA 142, 167 (Karin Kapadia ed., 2002) (attributing the
harsher subordination of women in the higher classes to their seclusion); see also
Wendy Olsen & Smita Mehta, Female Labour Participation in Rural and Urban India:
Does Housewives’ Work Count?, 93 RADSTATS J. (2006) (underscoring the perceived
desirability of the status of a housewife in areas of the country significantly
influenced by Hindu Brahminical norms, particularly in rural households where
women are compelled by necessity to work outside the home).
34 ANIL DUTTA MISHRA, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF WORKING WOMEN IN
URBAN INDIA 59 (1994) (stating that some of the forms of oppression that women
experience in the workplace include stares, remarks, and mockery).
35 See Narula, supra note 8, at 277–78 (noting that Dalit women are uniquely
oppressed due to their vulnerability to violence, their unequal access to services,
employment opportunities, and education, and the fact that government
development programs tend to prioritize initiatives that benefit Dalit men).
36 Sesha Kethineni & Gail Diane Humiston, Dalits, the “Oppressed People” of
India: How Are Their Social, Economic, and Human Rights Addressed?, 4 WAR CRIMES,
GENOCIDE, & CRIMES AGAINST HUMAN. 99, 104–05 (2010); see also Shuriah Niazi,
Madhya Pradesh’s Manual Scavengers Caste in a Trap, NEWS TRACK INDIA (Jan. 23,
2009), http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/64125 (describing the
occupation of manual scavenging, or the cleaning of non-flushing latrines, which
many lower-caste and marginalized women feel compelled to enter even though
they have been outlawed in India).
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people’s lives.37 As Smita Narula notes, “India is also an example
of injustice in the extreme: the numbers affected are greater, the
poverty is deeper, the atrocities are an every day affair, and
enforced servitude and segregation is the norm.”38 Pervasive de
facto occupational segregation creates immediately apparent social
division and limits the ability of members of disadvantaged groups
to better their social position. Due to intense discriminatory
attitudes on the part of employers, skewed distribution of
resources, and historical patterns of disadvantage, Dalits, the socalled backward classes (certain of the extremely disadvantaged
Shudra subcastes), and women are often relegated to menial
and/or undesirable areas of employment.39
The ingrained
structures of inequality that constitute the framework of Indian
society necessitate an approach to equality that takes into account
the insurmountable barriers that prevent certain sections of society
from availing themselves of opportunity.
3.

INDIA’S APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

The Indian government has primarily taken a substantive view
of equality, selectively applying formal equality principles in
certain cases.40 In line with this emphasis, the government has
focused on compensating for and remedying existing social
hierarchies.41 Substantive equality recognizes the existence of
social classifications and seeks to target those social structures that
contribute to the subordination of historically disadvantaged
groups.42
Formal equality, in contrast, overlooks social
classifications and attempts to ensure neutral application of laws
and policies and non-discrimination among individuals.43 While
substantive equality, with its recognition of real social differences
Narula, supra note 8, at 260.
Id.
39 CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 55; MEDIRATTA,
supra note 6, at 17.
40 Chandola, supra note 10, at 110.
41 Sridharan, supra note 28, at 99–100.
42 Claire McHugh, The Equality Principle in E.U. Law: Taking a Human Rights
Approach?, 14 IRISH STUDENT L. REV. 31, 34 (2006).
43 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
107, 108 (1976) (describing the formal-equality based antidiscrimination principle
employed by U.S. Courts in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution as reflecting the idea that “similar things should be treated
similarly”).
37
38
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between groups, embraces affirmative action in favor of
disadvantaged groups as being in itself an essential part of
equality, formal equality views affirmative action as an exception
to equality to be avoided if at all possible.44
The Indian Constitution contains both formal and substantive
equality provisions, suggesting recognition on the part of the
founders that uniformly applied formal equality would perpetuate
the existing structural inequalities.45 Although the Constitution
mandates equality under the laws and prescribes a merit-based
regime of advancement in government employment, it also
expressly endorses a vision of substantive equality that is anchored
in affirmative action to empower minorities to compete on more
equal terms with members of more privileged groups.46 That the
state has embraced this constitutional directive is evident in the
fact that the primary approach the government has taken to
eradicating employment discrimination is a system of
compensatory discrimination in the form of quotas.47 Under this
system, 49.5% of positions in higher education and national
government employment are reserved for members of the
scheduled and backward classes.48 The reservation system for
women is less comprehensive, but nevertheless sets aside one third
of seats in municipal (local) governments for female candidates.49
Various other affirmative action provisions implemented on
discretionary bases by the state and central governments
complement this approach.50 Compensatory discrimination is
rooted in the belief that, in the absence of strict quotas, minorities
disadvantaged due to rigid societal hierarchies will be denied
access to gainful employment.51 There is also the hope that the

44 Jason Morgan-Foster, From Hutchins Hall to Hyderabad and Beyond: A
Comparative Look at Affirmative Action in Three Jurisdictions, 9 WASH. & LEE RACE &
ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 73, 81 (2003).
45 Chandola, supra note 10, at 110.
46 Sridharan, supra note 28, at 144.
47 Id. at 111–12.
48 Morgan-Foster, supra note 44, at 87.
49 Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, Women as Policy-Makers:
Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1409, 1410
(2004).
50 MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES
OF INDIA 380 (1984).
51 See Prior, supra note 11, at 77–78 (“The [framers of India’s Constitution]
believed that compensatory discrimination in this field was both a method to
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increased presence of members of disadvantaged groups in
positions of power will translate into more opportunities for
members of these groups across the board.
In addition to constitutional protections against employment
discrimination, the legislature has enacted a handful of statutes
that address various aspects of discrimination in the workplace.
For the purposes of this analysis, the most significant of these
statutes is the Equal Remuneration Act of 1976, which guarantees
women equal treatment in the workplace.52 The Act forbids
discrimination in hiring, pay, and conditions of employment
between male and female workers engaged in the same or similar
work, except where dissimilar treatment is mandated or permitted
under the law.53
4.

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

Although India’s primarily substantive approach to equality in
employment rightly recognizes the potential for perpetuation of
existing hierarchies in the absence of special solicitude for the
interests of the disadvantaged,54 the Indian approach has failed to
generate the anticipated results. The shortcomings of the Indian
approach lie in: (1) its limited reach, (2) the near abdication of
responsibility by the legislative branch of government, and (3) the
judiciary’s seemingly incoherent superimposition of formal
equality principles on a vision of substantive equality colored by
regressive cultural norms.

strengthen India’s underprivileged and a means of preventing upper classes from
obstructing the admission of backward classes into government employment.”).
52 Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, No. 25, Amendment 1987, No. 49 (India).
53 Id. Cf. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1963) (forbidding discrimination in
wages between men and women engaged in similar work in regulated American
workplaces).
54 Sandra Fredman, Facing the Future: Substantive Equality Under the Spotlight
25 n.62 (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 57,
2010) (noting that the Indian substantive equality approach allows individuals
who show socio-economic disadvantage as well as membership in a certain
disadvantaged status group to qualify for benefits in order to achieve equality. In
addition, the Indian Constitution permits special provisions to be made for two
categories of disadvantaged groups, of which one is comprised of “Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes”).
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4.1. The Lack of a Comprehensive Framework
The lack of a comprehensive legal framework to address
employment discrimination in its various forms imposes
significant barriers to the realization of a robust equality of
employment opportunity in India. India has thus far relied almost
exclusively on its system of compensatory discrimination to root
out such inequality, and this approach has met with only moderate
success.55 A system grounded almost entirely on quotas is
inherently limited because it disregards the manifold ways in
which discrimination and structural inequality may operate in the
workplace.56 For example, a quota system does not address
disparities in wages, promotion opportunities, and conditions of
employment.
The limitations of India’s reservation-based
approach are compounded by the fact that reservations are
primarily concentrated in relatively undesirable areas of
employment such as menial or janitorial work.57 In this manner,
members of disadvantaged groups remain segregated in areas of
employment traditionally associated with their castes.58 Instructive
in this regard is the experience of nearly a hundred Dalit workers
in the city of Ahmedabad, who, despite having advanced degrees
in a range of subjects, could find only janitorial employment.59
In practice, reservations benefit less than one percent of the
Dalit population.60 The private and agricultural sectors, which
together account for a huge percentage of the total market, are

55 Sridharan, supra note 28, at 111–12 (“India’s policy of ‘compensatory
discrimination’ consisted primarily of quotas, or strict reservations of designated
percentages of government positions for beneficiary groups, according to their
representation in the society. Membership in a beneficiary group alone qualified
a candidate to receive a reserved position.”).
56 See Ito, supra note 13, at 299 (underscoring the limitations of India’s
reservation-based approach to employment discrimination).
57 See CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 28 (noting that
Dalits occupy more than 65 percent of government sweeping positions and only
16.7 percent of non-sweeping positions).
58 Id.
59 Randeep Ramesh, Untouchables in New Battle for Jobs, THE GUARDIAN
(Manchester), Oct. 2, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/03/
india.randeepramesh.
60 Narula, supra note 8, at 312–15 (arguing that although reservations
provided greater opportunities for Dalits to reach political and government
positions, as well as positions as engineers and surgeons, they have not yet
benefited the majority population of Dalits).
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outside the purview of reservations.61 The recent trend toward
liberalization, with its concomitant privatization of industries, has
further limited the compensatory discrimination system by taking
these jobs out of the reach of reservations.62 Due to a range of
factors, including resistance on the part of private employers and
the informal working conditions prevalent in agricultural work,
these sectors have been left almost wholly unregulated.63
Although the Equal Remuneration Act and a smattering of other
legislation provide women in private sector workplaces with some
measure of protection from discrimination, members of the
scheduled and backward classes are excluded from many of these
protections under the existing statutory scheme.64 Discrimination
outside the public sector is both blatant and rampant. To take one
example, as reported in The Guardian’s story of Dalits battling for
better jobs, Prakash Chauhan, who held a masters degree in
Commerce, found his offer of employment at an accounting firm
rescinded upon the firm’s discovery that he was a Dalit. Chauhan

61 See Thorat & Attewell, supra note 13, at 4144 (“[I]t appears that caste
favouritism and the social exclusion of dalits . . . have infused private enterprises
even in the most dynamic modern sector of the Indian economy.”). For
employment figures, see Employment in Public and Organised Private Sectors,
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?
id=13602 (last visited May 3, 2013); see also BINO PAUL ET AL., INDIA LABOUR
MARKET REPORT 2008 (2009), available at http://www.macroscan.org/anl/may09/
pdf/Indian_Labour.pdf (analyzing Indian labor market composition, trends, and
issues).
62 Narula, supra note 8, at 318 (stating that the economic liberalization in
India, or more specifically, the philosophy of increased reliance on market forces
and the reduced role of the state, has lead to the shrinking of the public sector and
thus harmed the efficiency of the reservations model and its possible effects).
63 See Barbara Harriss-White & Nandini Gooptu, Mapping India’s World of
Unorganized Labour, 37 SOCIALIST REG. 89, 89 (2001) (“Out of India’s huge labour
force, over 390 million strong, only 7% are in the organized sector . . . . ‘Organized
sector labour’ means workers on regular wages or salaries, in registered firms and
with access to the state social security system and its framework of labour law.
The rest—93% of the labour force—works in what is known as the ‘unorganized’
or ‘informal’ economy.”); see also Priya Deshingkar, Extending Labour Inspections to
the Informal Sector and Agriculture 7 (Chronic Poverty Research Ctr., Working
Paper No. 154, 2009), http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_
files/WP154%20Deshingkar.pdf (noting that informal workers, including
agricultural workers, are not covered by basic labor laws).
64 See CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 26 (noting that
India has failed to provide Dalits with adequate protection against discrimination
in employment).
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was ultimately forced to take up sweeping when he could find no
other employment.65
Even for those nominally protected under the existing statutory
scheme, effective recourse has proven difficult or impossible to
obtain.66 The Equal Remuneration Act is a criminal statute, which
requires victims of employment discrimination to register
complaints with labor inspectors designated by the states.67 The
criminal system is limited in its ability to adequately address
employment discrimination in its various forms.68 The penalties
for violations of employment statutes are relatively minimal, and
suffer from chronic underenforcement.69 The limited legal redress
offered disincentivizes complaints because victims have little to
gain from expensive and drawn-out litigation that gives them little
in the way of compensatory damages. Corruption is endemic, and
labor inspectors tend to be overworked and underpaid.70 The
interests of marginalized groups are thus often neglected.
4.2. The Legislature’s Abdication of Responsibility
India’s approach to employment discrimination has also fallen
short of the Constitution’s egalitarian objectives because of the
failure of the legislative branch to adequately fulfill its part in
implementing substantive equality.71 Political expediency tends to

Ramesh, supra note 59.
See Aditi Kavarana, Equal Remuneration Act 11 (Ctr. for Civil Soc’y,
Working Paper No. 15, 2000), http://economics--www.ccsindia.org/ccsindia/
policy/rule/ studies/wp0015.pdf (reporting that Assistant Labour Commissioner
K.R. Sawhney’s claim that enforcement of the Equal Remuneration Act is
accorded minimal importance in Delhi).
67 Equal Remuneration Act, supra note 52.
68 Cf. Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the CivilCriminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315 (2008) (proposing that employment
discrimination should be conceptualized as being neither civil nor criminal in
order to overcome the limitations of each of these procedural paths).
69 Kavarana, supra note 66, at 10–11 (explaining that enforcement of these
laws suffer from inefficiency since, among other issues, labor inspectors are often
over-burdened with work as they are few in number and are required to oversee
the implementation of more than 28 labor laws, in addition to the general
reluctance of workers to file complaints).
70 Id. at 10.
71 Sood, supra note 17, at 847–48 (noting the danger of “judicial overreaching”
and the Supreme Court’s activism while arguing that the judiciary lacks the
competence of the legislative and executive branches to enact laws and make
administrative decisions).
65
66
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drive legislative decisions, and there is a perceived need by
legislators to appease influential voting blocs.72 That need for
political support makes legislators hesitant to champion
controversial initiatives that seek to mitigate discrimination against
minorities when these initiatives do not align with the legislators’
political interests.73 Thus, influential members of nominally
disadvantaged castes have gained at the expense of the genuinely
disadvantaged.74 The highly politicized system of compensatory
discrimination provides one example of this. New castes are
continually added to the affirmative action rosters at the behest of
politicians eager to secure their interest with these groups, with
little inquiry into their backwardness or lack thereof.75 These
castes, unlike the Dalits, vary widely in terms of their social and
economic status with many in fact being economically and
politically powerful.76 Few are ever removed from the reservation
lists.77
The legislative branch has repeatedly reneged on its
constitutional obligation to introduce legislation to remedy the

72 Pager, supra note 9, at 338 (arguing that a politicized process in the
determination of “disadvantaged” groups could cause manipulation of the system
and lead to corruption, as evidenced in India).
73 Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 22, at 552 (describing the formation of castebased interest groups, each lobbying for economic benefits and the extension of
reservations to members of their caste, is “used by politicians to mobilize support
for elections and collective action.”).
74 Id. at 550 (“In general, the benefits only reach those lower caste people who
have already attained an elite position in society through economics, politics, or
education.”).
75 The Dalits, in contrast, tend to be almost uniformly marginalized.
Reservations tend to dominate any discussion on empowering Dalits, and other
important considerations are inadequately explored. In this regard, commentator
P. Sainath has observed, “In the media, any debate on Dalit rights is about
reservation, and not about water, health, sanitation or land rights. In the minds of
the media audience, we have created a stereotype that Dalit is equal to
reservation, which is taken out of the context of all these other deprivations.”
Trend of Repackaging Casteism Growing, THE HINDU (Chennai), Dec. 7, 2007,
http://www.hindu.com/2007/12/07/stories/2007120759081200.htm.
76 Narula, supra note 8, at 324–25 (noting that the Indian government
implemented on individuals who attempt to claim disadvantaged status to receive
benefits a more complex test, which accounts for a variety of social, educational,
and economic factors such that the claimant’s occupation and wealth, for example,
would be considered).
77 Pager, supra note 9, at 338 (arguing that the cause of this permanent status
is rooted in the “reservation politics,” which “dominate election campaigns and
attract corruption”).
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effects of discrimination on disadvantaged minorities. Although
the media, the public, and the Sachar Committee have called for a
comprehensive employment statute in recent years, no concrete
action in this direction has yet been taken.78 Nor has the legislature
followed up on proposals to establish a centralized agency to
address discrimination in employment.79 Large gaps remain in the
employment discrimination framework, and there has been little
action to fill this void.
The legislature’s inadequate discharge of its responsibilities has
forced the judiciary to assume an increasingly activist position.80
For example, the Court created so-called public interest litigation, a
framework that empowers public interest agencies and the public
to litigate claims on behalf of underprivileged victims of alleged
government discrimination or inaction.81 In Vishaka v. State of
Rajasthan, the Supreme Court of India filled a conspicuous void in
employment discrimination law by issuing comprehensive sexual
harassment guidelines binding on both public and private
employers.82 The Court issued these guidelines after considering a
case in which a government employee had been raped in
retaliation for her work against rural child marriage.83 Even
though the sexual assault occurred in a public workplace, the
Court’s resultant employment discrimination guidelines regulated
private employers too, underscoring judicial activism. In drafting
these guidelines, the Court pointed to the complete absence of
78 See Anti-Discrimination/Sex Equality, supra note 15 (stating that in 2006, the
Sachar Committee recommended a new framework for addressing discrimination
against minorities in employment, arguing that “India needs an equality
legislation that protects multiple characteristics, extends beyond the private and
public divide and addresses manifest discrimination in society”).
79 See id. (highlighting the 2008 Menon Committee’s recommendation that an
Equal Opportunity Commission be formed to address the grievances of minority
workers).
80 See Madhav Khosla, Addressing Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court:
Towards an Evolved Debate, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 56 (2009)
(examining how a particular academic approach can contribute to the evolving
discourse on judicial activism in the Indian Supreme Court).
81 See Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 22, at 560 (noting that the Indian Supreme
Court’s introduction of public interest litigation has contributed to increasing
opportunities for the adjudication of incidents of alleged discrimination).
82 See Vishaka v. Rajasthan, (1997) 6 S.C.C. 241 (India) (citing a petition
brought by social activists that sought to bring attention to the rights of working
women and assist in identifying methods by which gender equality in India can
be achieved).
83 Id.
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legislation addressing the pervasive problem of sexual harassment
The Court also acknowledged the
in the workplace.84
shortcomings of a judicially mandated sexual harassment
framework, but maintained that the importance of the issue
necessitated extraordinary action.85 It stipulated that its guidelines
would be binding only until appropriate legislation was enacted.86
Legislative inaction has thus enabled the Supreme Court to assume
an increasingly prominent role in shaping employment
discrimination policy.
4.3. The Supreme Court’s Intermingling of Formal and Substantive
Equality
The effective implementation of substantive equality in the
realm of employment has also been hindered by the Supreme
Court’s seemingly random intermingling of formal equality
principles with a substantive equality framework that has at times
drawn upon regressive cultural norms.87 The Court’s embrace of a
primarily substantive approach to equality is reflected in its
recognition of the differences between social groups.88 Thus, the
Court has repeatedly upheld the validity of affirmative action
schemes to benefit disadvantaged castes and women. The Court
has noted that a strictly neutral application of laws and policies, as
required by formal equality, will not meaningfully implement the

Id.
Id. For a discussion of the drawbacks of judicial policymaking, see Sood,
supra note 17, at 847–48 (explaining that, as appointed officials, judges are not
directly accountable to the people, that the judiciary is inherently limited in its
ability to acquire a wide range of information to create effective policy, and that
judicial overreaching risks retaliation by the other governmental branches,
leading to loss of judicial credibility).
86 Id.
87 Kannabiran, supra note 24, at 90 (explaining the issue of sex discrimination
in the context of relationships as expressed in the jurisprudence on sex
discrimination).
88 See, e.g., Kerala v. Thomas, (1976) 2 S.C.C. 310 (India) (permitting the
government of the state of Kerala to make special exceptions, other than
reservations, for members of the scheduled castes and tribes in government
employment); see also Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477
(India) (affirming the state’s authority to make provision, in the form of
reservations, concessions, or exceptions, for the advancement of the backward
classes, provided that backwardness was not determined solely on the basis of
caste).
84
85
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guarantee of equality enshrined in the Constitution.89 Although
the Court has, on many occasions, appropriately recognized the
disparities in social standing among different groups, it has not
uniformly applied these substantive equality principles in cases
involving extremely underprivileged parties. The Court has, on
occasion, resorted to a shortsighted, selective application of formal
equality principles, specifically in the context of cases involving
discrimination against women, and the incoherence of its doctrine
in this regard has yielded unsatisfactory results. Thus, for
instance, in Javed v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court upheld a
state law that prevented people with more than two children from
serving in municipal government roles in spite of evidence that
such a requirement would disproportionately burden women, who
are often pressured or coerced by husbands and in-laws into
having more children than they otherwise wish to bear.90
In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, the Court was confronted with a
discriminatory policy that distinguished between the male and
female members of the cabin crew of India’s biggest airline. Air
India established separate cadres, with different terms of
employment for the male assistant flight pursers and the female

89 See Thomas, 2 S.C.C. 310 at 513 (“The principle of proportionate equality is
attained only when equals are tr[e]ated equally and unequals are treated
unequally.”).
90 Javed v. Haryana, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3057 (India) (“It was also submitted that
the impugned disqualification would hit the women worst, inasmuch as in the
Indian society they have no independence and they almost helplessly bear a third
child if their husbands want them to do so. This contention need not detain us
any longer. A male who compels his wife to bear a third child would disqualify
not only his wife, but himself as well. We do not think that with the awareness
which is rising in Indian women folk, they are so helpless as to be compelled to
bear a third child even though they do not wish to do so.”); see also Letter from
Melissa Upreti, Senior Manager & Legal Adviser for Asia, Ctr. for Reproductive
Rights, to the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Apr. 17, 2008),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/info-ngos/CFRR
India40.pdf (“These types of policies disproportionately affect women, as they fail
to take into account the ‘social context of early marriages, early pregnancies and
son preferences . . . all the responsibility is placed only on individuals, particularly
women, with serious consequences for them.’ Policies such as the Haryana
provision exacerbate social problems such as sex-selective abortions and the
abandonment of female infants. Other consequences of the Haryana policy and
similar include rampant falsification of hospital and birth records; marital
desertion; divorce; denial of paternity by male political candidates; and general
disenfranchisement of the women who are already underrepresented in decisionmaking bodies—those from marginalized and poor communities.”).
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airhostesses.91 The two classes performed substantially similar
types of work.92 The policy at issue required airhostesses, but not
assistant pursers, to quit (1) upon marriage, if it occurred within
four years of joining the airline, (2) upon conception of a child, or
(3) upon reaching the age of thirty-five, unless granted a special
extension up to the age of forty-five.93 In a convoluted opinion that
mixed substantive and formal equality provisions, the Court
upheld certain parts of the policy while striking others. In
upholding the clause that required airhostesses to remain
unmarried for four years after joining the airline, the Court
reasoned that the provision was in the interests of the employees.94
In the Court’s view, the requirement would ensure that
airhostesses would only enter into the institution of marriage
physically prepared and with the necessary maturity.95 The Court
also upheld the differential retirement ages for airhostesses and
pursers, observing in this regard that the two cadres were separate
classes and therefore did not have to be governed by the same
terms of employment.96 It stipulated, however, that extensions of
employment up to the age of forty-five were to be granted on a
non-discretionary basis provided that the airhostess in question
was in good health, in order to ensure non-discrimination within
the airhostess cadre.97
Finally, the Court struck down the
prohibition on pregnancy, remarking that “divert[ing] the ordinary
course of human nature” in this manner was “an open insult to
Indian womanhood—the most sacrosanct and cherished
institution.”98 It wholeheartedly sanctioned, however, a proffered
alternative version of the provision that mandated retirement upon
an airhostess’ third pregnancy.99
Upon nearly identical facts, in July 2003, the Supreme Court in
Air India Cabin Crew Association v. Yeshawinee Merchant reversed a

91 Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1829 (India) (discussing the
disparity in treatment between employees of the airline on the basis of sex,
including the employees’ age of retirement and promotional opportunities).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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Bombay High Court decision mandating non-discrimination
between the male and female cadres, upholding in full its 1989
Nergesh Meerza decision.100 In delivering its opinion, the Court
noted that some of the airhostesses were members of the union that
had negotiated these disparate terms.101 It reflected, with regard to
the earlier retirement age mandated for airhostesses, that “[t]here
is nothing objectionable for airhostesses to wish for a peaceful and
tension-free life at home with their families in the middle age and
avoid remaining away for long durations on international flights,”
apparently overlooking the fact that the airhostesses challenging
the policy were not so inclined.102 Perhaps most surprisingly, the
Court, viewing the union’s negotiation of the conditions of
retirement as evidence that the airhostesses considered this
provision “favourable to them,” categorized this provision as the
type of “special treatment” authorized by the Equal Remuneration
Act to be performed in favor of women.103 In other words, the
100 Air India Cabin Crew Ass’n v. Yeshawinee Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 187
(India) (reviewing the correctness of the view taken by the Bombay High Court
with respect to the alleged sex discrimination on the part of Air India against its
employees).
101 See id. (“Where terms and conditions are fixed through collective
bargaining as a comprehensive package deal in the course of industrial
adjudication and terms of service and retirement age are fixed under agreements,
settlements or awards, the same cannot be termed as unfavourable treatment
meted out to the women workers only on basis of their sex and one or the other
alone tinkered so as to retain the beneficial terms dehors other offered as part of a
package deal.”). Cf. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1458 (2009)
(holding that provisions in a collective bargaining agreement compelling
arbitration of statutory claims are enforceable).
102 Yeshawinee Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 187 at ¶ 57. These disparate terms of
employment now dictated as follows: (1) that airhostesses retire at the age of fifty
while pursers have until the age of fifty-eight to do so, (2) that women retire upon
their third pregnancy, while men are free to continue working regardless of how
many children they have, (3) that women are not entitled to hold supervisory
positions on board the aircraft and (4) that airhostesses older than thirty-five years
old receive yearly gynecological examinations as a condition of employment,
while pursers are exempt from any examination. See also Anupama Katakam, A
Case of Discrimination, FRONTLINE, Oct. 11, 2003, http://www.frontlineonnet.com/
fl2021/ stories/ 20031024005413000.htm.
103 See Yeshawinee Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 187 at ¶ 39 (“The twin Articles 15
and 16 prohibit a discriminatory treatment but not preferential or special
treatment of women, which is a positive measure in their favour. The
Constitution does not prohibit the employer to consider sex in making the
employment decisions where this is done pursuant to a properly or legally
chartered affirmative action plan.”). This finding is particularly startling because
the lower court had found that one of Air India’s central reasons for establishing
separate cadres for male and female staff was the universal opposition of male
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Court interpreted the substantive equality exception to the Equal
Remuneration Act, which permits the government to take special
action for the benefit of women, to allow Air India to mandate that
its female employees retire at an earlier age than similarly situated
males.
Nergesh Meerza is widely cited by scholars as a thorn in the
Supreme Court’s substantive equality jurisprudence.104
In
interpreting the equality provisions of the Constitution, the Court
employed myopic and circular reasoning that essentially upheld
continuing discriminatory treatment based on a superficial
division of men and women into different classes that assigned
men arguably preferable terms of employment.105 The results fell
far short of the egalitarian objectives expressed by the framers of
the Constitution.
Consistent with a substantive approach to equality, the Nergesh
Meerza and Yeshawinee Merchant Courts viewed themselves to be
acting for the particular benefit of female workers, whom they
perceived as being differently situated and having different
priorities from their male coworkers. The Court believed that in
staff to the possibility of reporting to a female supervisor. Air India drafted the
policy to ensure that only a male staff member could serve as a flight supervisor.
Kannabiran, supra note 24, at 95 (“The [Bombay High Court] rejected this
argument[,] asserting that ‘the hierarchy on board the aircraft will be based on
seniority irrespective of sex,’ a decision the Supreme Court set aside.’”); see also
Katakam, supra note 102 (describing the apparent nature of the union’s priorities
in the statement by Rajeev Joshi, Vice-President of the Air-India Cabin Crew
Association, the union responsible for negotiating these terms: “[T]he girls were
recruited to serve passengers. The airline wanted young and beautiful women to
be the face of Air-India. How can we keep up our service standards with women
who don’t look fresh and capable?”).
104 See, e.g., Kannabiran, supra note 24, at 92 (citing various passages from the
Nergesh Meerza decision that demonstrated the court’s focus on the role Indian
women play in family planning and analyzing the provisions concerning the fouryear ban on marriage and the termination of employment upon a woman’s first
pregnancy).
105 See Nergesh Meerza, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1829 at ¶ 59 (employing circular
reasoning that nullified constitutional and statutory guarantees of equality, the
Court essentially accepted Air India’s blatantly discriminatory system of
classification as per se evidence of men and women being differently situated for
the purposes of formal equality analysis: “[A]Hs [Air Hostesses] from [sic] an
absolutely separate category from that of the AFPs [Air Flight Pursers] in many
respects having different grades, different promotional avenues and different
service conditions.”); see also Kannabiran, supra note 24, at 95 (noting that the
employer is not required to demonstrate, task by task, the differences in work
requirements for males and females in order to justify differential treatment based
on gender).
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permitting airhostesses to negotiate terms purportedly favorable to
them, it was acting in their best interests.106 This approach to
substantive equality ultimately failed because it assumed, on the
basis of regressive gendered norms, that male and female
employees had different priorities.107 It imposed what it believed
to be substantive equality of opportunity to negotiate terms of
employment without inquiring into the actual bargaining power of
women within the union or the ways in which the gendered
context in which they were operating limited their ability to
negotiate better terms for themselves.108
Compounding the problem was the Court’s myopic application
of formal equality. It essentially viewed the airline’s classification
of male and female employees into separate cadres, with attendant
disparate terms of employment, as evidence of these two cadres
being separate classes not similarly situated for the purposes of
formal equality analysis. Although the Court applied formal
equality within the class of airhostesses to strike down the
discretionary aspect of extensions beyond the default age of
retirement, it refused to mandate that the airline offer the same
terms of employment to both male and female employees. This

106 See Yeshawinee Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 187 at ¶ 41 (“In employment
requiring duties on Air craft, gender-neutral provisions of service may not be
found necessarily to be beneficial for women. The nature of duties and functions
on board of an Air craft do deserve some kind of a different and preferential
treatment of women compared to men.”).
107 For an overview of the Supreme Court’s application of similarly
regressive reasoning in recent case law in this and other contexts, see Kannabiran,
supra note 24.
108 This is a particularly pressing concern because trade unions in India have
failed to adequately prioritize the interests of women and other underprivileged
groups. See Rohini Hensman, Trade Unions and Women’s Autonomy: Organisational
Strategies of Women Workers in India, in GENDER, DIVERSITY AND TRADE UNIONS:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 95, 95 (Fiona Colgan & Sue Ledwith eds., 2002)
(“[W]hile some progress has certainly been made, women and disadvantaged
sections of society remain marginalised in the labour force, and trade unions still
fail to recognise the importance of tackling this issue.”); Kamala Sankaran &
Roopa Madhav, Gender Equality and Social Dialogue in India 32–33 (ILO, Working
Paper No. 1/2011, Jan. 2011), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/publication/wcms_150428.pdf (“The
lack of women in such negotiations also has adverse effects on women. The
agreements concluded with the cabin crew in the Air India [sic] agreed to a
disparity in retirement age for women; challenges by individual women were
turned down by the courts on the ground that these were binding on all cabin
crew. Even in the recent collective agreements entered into by the Air India Cabin
Crew Association and Air India, there were no women representing employees.”).
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decision was so despite the Court’s acknowledgment of a
substantial similarity in the types of work performed by the
airhostesses and the pursers.109
In accepting the airline’s
superficial distinction between the two classes based on
discriminatory terms of employment and the purportedly different
interests and priorities of the two groups, and in refusing to
require equal conditions for similar work, as required by the terms
of the Equal Remuneration Act, the Court intermingled substantive
and formal equality in such a manner as to render both doctrines
ineffective.
5.

SOLUTIONS

5.1. Legislative Solutions
The deeply ingrained and multilayered structural inequalities
that underlie Indian society necessitate the adoption of a
substantive approach to equality that takes into account the fact
that actors differently situated may not benefit in the same ways
from a uniform application of equality principles.110 However,
India’s existing approach to substantive equality has yielded
unpredictable and unsatisfactory results, in part, because the
existing framework is limited in its reach and flawed in its
approach to employment discrimination.
The limitations of a primarily reservation-based system and the
inadequacy of the current statutory scheme to account for various
types of discrimination against a full range of disadvantaged
groups significantly qualify the ability of the current framework to
address the problem of employment discrimination.111 One
possible solution that has been increasingly proposed in recent

109 See Nergesh Meerza, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1829 at ¶ 62 (observing that the
difference in the type of work performed by the two cadres was “one of degree
rather than of kind”).
110 In this regard, Chief Justice Bhagwati of the Indian Supreme Court
observed, “In a hierarchical society with an indelible feudal stamp and incurable
actual inequality, it is absurd to suggest that progressive measures to eliminate
group disabilities . . . are antagonistic to equality on the ground that every
individual is entitled to equality of opportunity based purely on merit . . . .” Jain
v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 942, 968 (India) (discussing the concept of
equality under the Constitution of India and the prospect of equality becoming a
“living reality for the large masses of people” in the country).
111 INDIA CONST. arts. 14–16.
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years has been to extend reservations to the private sector.112
However, this step would have to be carefully considered in view
of the significant opposition such proposals have met in the private
sector.113 India is a developing country, with strong reasons to
encourage a competitive business environment, and the possible
detrimental effects of such legislation on industry would therefore
need to be fully explored.
A less drastic solution might involve the legislation of a
comprehensive umbrella employment statute,114 which would
guarantee freedom from discrimination in the workplace to a full
range of disadvantaged minorities. Such a statute would articulate
the types of adverse actions that would qualify as illegal
employment discrimination and the remedies to be made available
to victims of such discrimination. It might impose a responsibility
on private employers to take reasonable steps to ensure the full
participation of minorities in the workplace. Given existing
hierarchies, such a provision would necessarily require that
employers make certain reasonable accommodations to create an
environment in which disadvantaged workers would have the
opportunity to function on par with their more privileged
coworkers. An employment discrimination statute would provide

112 Narula, supra note 8, at 319 (describing the arguments of Indian economist
Sukhadeo Thorat in favor of extending reservations to the private sector to redress
market discrimination against Dalits); Anti-Discrimination/Sex Equality, supra note
15 (elaborating on the issues pertaining to anti-discrimination and sex equality,
including the constitutional background, the existing legislative framework, and a
proposed law concerning the matter). State governments have taken some steps
in this direction. See, e.g., Mayawati Announces Reservations in Private Sector,
EXPRESSINDIA (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Maya
wati-announces-reservations-in-private-sector/262923/ (highlighting an initiative
by the government of Uttar Pradesh to introduce reservations in companies
working on projects in conjunction with the state).
113 Narula, supra note 8 at 319 (stating private employers and political parties
still strongly oppose the private sector proposal). For a discussion of the
arguments in favor of and against reservations in the private sector, see generally
Jayati Ghosh, On Reservations in the Private Sector, FRONTLINE, Nov. 4, 2005, http://
www.flonnet.com/fl2222/stories/20051104004110800.htm
(explaining
that
although a policy of reservation in the private sector would not affect efficiency, it
would help to correct historically entrenched and still pervasive social
discrimination); see also G. Thimmaiah, Implications of Reservations in Private Sector,
40 ECON. & POL. WKLY 745, 745–50 (2005) (outlining the implications of the
proposal to extend reservations to the private sector).
114 Cf. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (prohibiting
discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, or national
origin).
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guidelines for the courts in interpreting state guarantees of
equality, and would extend equality protections to the private and
agricultural sectors. It might incorporate a presumption in favor of
disadvantaged employees in order to ease the extremely heavy
burden of litigation.115
The existing employment discrimination framework would be
further enhanced through the provision of positive incentives such
as tax breaks, subsidies, and new business licenses to encourage
employers to hire more workers from disadvantaged groups and
to take extraordinary steps to ensure substantive equality in the
workplace.
Employers should be encouraged to educate
themselves and their employees about their rights and
responsibilities under the law. Positive incentives would likely be
met with a greater level of acceptance within the private sector
than would more drastic remedies such as private-sector
reservations. They would carry the additional benefit of ensuring
a happier and better-trained workforce, as employers would be
incentivized to provide such accommodations as additional
training for workers from disadvantaged groups.
The limitations of the existing framework might be further
addressed through the provision of civil remedies in addition to
the existing criminal penalties for violations of employment law.
The Equal Remuneration Act is a criminal statute, which prescribes
fines and imprisonment for illegal discrimination.116 Although the
criminal law places the responsibility of prosecuting offenses on
the state, and thereby alleviates the burden of litigation on victims
of employment discrimination who may have limited financial
resources, the absence of damages may disincentivize the pursuit
of judicial remedies.
Concomitantly, the relatively minimal
penalties associated with infractions fail to deter employers from

115 Such presumptions are relatively common in the Indian legal system. See,
e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burdens of Equality: Burdens of Proof and
Presumptions in Indian and American Civil Rights Law, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 101
(“[U]pon the establishment of certain facts in an abetment of suicide prosecution,
a court may presume that the defendant abetted the victim’s suicide . . . .
[P]resumptions of this kind reflect ‘those natural inferences which the ‘common
course of natural events,’ human conduct, and public and private business
suggest to us.’”) (quoting M.C. SARKAR, S.C. SARKAR, & PROABHAS C. SARKAR, 1
SARKAR’S LAW OF EVIDENCE 66, 67 (13th ed. 1993)).
116 Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, No. 25, Amendment 1987, No. 49 (India).
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engaging in discrimination.117 Widespread corruption among
labor inspectors and the fact that the inspectors are overworked
and underpaid result in a failure to adequately prioritize women’s
interests.118 These obstacles deter prospective complainants from
asserting their rights under the Act. The provision of a civil cause
of action may bridge this gap by providing incentives for victims to
seek judicial recourse and by ensuring that, at least in some cases,
those pursuing judicial remedies will have a vested interest in the
outcome. High-profile employment litigation, with significant
damages at stake, may act as a general deterrent to employers who
might otherwise discriminate with impunity.
To ensure adequate protection for complainants with limited
means, the Indian government should explore possible incentives
to encourage public interest organizations and other entities to
help provide adequate legal representation.119
Members of
disadvantaged groups are often unaware of their rights, and thus
cannot take advantage of the protections afforded to them under
the law.120 An agency that could work in tandem with the Courts
and would have the power to oversee, investigate, and litigate
employment disputes would help fill this gap.121 Such an agency
would presumably have the resources to effectively issue concrete
guidelines that would help employers remain within the bounds of
the law and would assist the Courts in reaching informed
judgments.122 It would also have the power to oversee the actions

117 Indira Hirway & Neha Shah, Labour and Employment Under Globalization:
The Case of Gujarat, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY., no. 22, 57, 62 (May 28, 2011).
118 See Deshingkar, supra note 63, at 12–14 (discussing the inadequate labor
inspection machinery in India).
119 Public interest litigation is one vehicle by which public service agencies
are empowered to help provide legal representation. See supra section 4.2.
120 Chandola, supra note 10, at 128 (explaining that although the untouchable
litigants have access to the judicial system in India, sometimes they do not pursue
legal remedies due to their ignorance regarding legal options).
121 India might be guided in this regard by the example of, for instance, the
American Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
122 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the United States, for
instance, provides guidance as to the government’s equal employment
opportunity program and adjudicates disputes. See About EEOC, U.S. EQUAL
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ (last visited Mar. 13,
2013) (aggregating useful information about the Commission, including its
purpose, relevant laws, and enforcement and litigation issues relating to
discrimination against job applicants or employees).
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of labor inspectors and to address allegations of corruption and
misconduct within their ranks.
A more comprehensive framework, which would flesh out and
expand the existing protections, would help ensure robust
substantive equality in the realm of employment discrimination
law. However, given the failure of the legislature thus far to fulfill
its part in upholding substantive equality aside from the system of
reservations, the judiciary may be called upon to continue to take
an active role in paving the path to fuller minority rights.
5.2. Judicial Solutions
The fact that the legislature has been relatively reluctant to take
bold steps, other than in the form of reservations, to protect
disadvantaged minorities from discrimination in employment, has
meant that the judiciary has taken a more active role in upholding
the rights of the underprivileged.123 Some of the judiciary’s actions
have been problematic, but in the overall analysis, it has stepped in
to fill the vacuum created by the legislature’s inaction.124 Although
structural solutions are more properly the province of the
legislature, which has the resources and temporal bandwidth to
enact effective policies, in the current circumstances, it may
continue to fall to the judiciary to take the necessary steps to prod
the legislature into fulfilling its part in upholding substantive
equality.125
Vishaka opens up a means by which the judiciary may be able
to provide interim solutions to the deep-rooted structural
inequalities in India.126 In Vishaka, the Court issued sexual
harassment guidelines that were to be binding upon employers
until the Legislature enacted a comprehensive sexual harassment
law.127
Following the decision in Vishaka, the Parliament
123 Sood, supra note 17, at 845 (characterizing the activism of the judiciary as
largely the result of an effort to compensate for the inaction of the legislative and
executive branches of government).
124 Narula, supra note 8, at 322 (describing the Indian judiciary’s attempt to
reconcile India’s constitutional ideals with the “abysmal” condition of Dalit social
reality).
125 For a discussion of the problems inherent in judicial policymaking, see
text accompanying supra note 17.
126 See Sood, supra note 17, at 843 (noting that Courts have extremely wide
leeway in fashioning appropriate remedies in public interest litigation).
127 See Vishaka v. Rajasthan, (1997) 6 S.C.C. 241 (India) at 6–10 (noting that
these guidelines are necessary “in the absence of enacted law to provide fro [sic]
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introduced a sexual harassment bill that publicly acknowledged
the Court’s role in helping to bring this matter to the notice of the
Legislature.128 Although, as was observed by the Court itself,
judicially imposed corrective measures may not be an ideal
solution, they may in some measure alleviate the worst of the
problems that exist in the employment sphere.129 Such action on
the part of the Court may also play a useful role in prodding the
Legislature into action.130 The Legislature has often found it
expedient to let the courts take the first step in addressing divisive
matters that have the power to backfire against legislators, who are
directly accountable to the people.131 Whatever one thinks of the
Legislature for relinquishing its obligations in this manner, it may
be more willing to act when the Court has already confronted
divisive issues in the first instance.
In its interpretation of the State’s guarantees of equality,
particularly with respect to women, the judiciary should strive for
a richer vision of substantive equality, free from the regressive
effects of traditional norms. Substantive equality, as a matter of
principle, recognizes that in an intensely hierarchical social context,
members of disadvantaged groups are not similarly situated to
members of more privileged groups such that formal equality
would provide meaningful protection. When there is a significant
disparity in the social standing of individuals, a neutral application
of laws and policies will operate to the disadvantage of subjugated
groups. However, for substantive equality to be meaningful, it
cannot rely on the same stereotypical norms that underlie existing

the effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and
guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse, more particularly against sexual
harassment at work places”).
128 See Sood, supra note 17, at 872.
The so-called Protection of Women
Against Sexual Harassment at Workplace Bill remains pending in Parliament.
Himanshi Dhawan, Sexual Harassment Law May Soon Cover Domestic Workers,
TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 12, 2012, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ india/Sexualharassment-law-may-soon-cover-domestic-workers/articleshow/11456584.cms.
129 See Sood, supra note 17, at 845–46 (noting that the public is strongly
supportive of the judiciary’s activism, particularly in light of the failure of the
other branches of government to fulfill their obligations).
130 Id. at 844 (noting that the Court has on occasion directed the Legislature to
enact necessary laws through the vehicle of public interest litigation).
131 Id. at 847–48 (stating that some government branches have even welcomed
the judiciary’s activism, especially when it enabled politicians to abdicate their
legislative responsibility, claiming they must adhere to the Court’s orders).
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Judicial legitimization of regressive
social classifications.132
stereotypes has the effect of reinforcing social hierarchies that serve
to devalue certain people at the expense of others.133
Nergesh Meerza and Yeshawinee Merchant demonstrate that the
intermingling of substantive and formal equality, without regard
to the ways in which hierarchical norms define the social position
and expectations of members of disadvantaged groups,
exacerbates existing structural inequality.134 A strict application of
formal equality, which would have invalidated the classification
between pursers and airhostesses, may have produced more
palatable results in these cases; however, it has been observed that,
in intensely hierarchical contexts, formal equality often works to
the disadvantage of subordinated groups.135
To adequately account for the differences in both social
standing and access to opportunity between privileged and
underprivileged groups, the judiciary should, as a matter of
general practice, first look at cases through the lens of a substantive
equality approach designed to dismantle those factors that operate
to perpetuate the subordination of the disadvantaged. Formal

132 See Kannabiran, supra note 24, at 90 (“To the extent that they reflect and
correspond with systems of social inequality, differentiation and classification
may be the source of discrimination.”).
133 Scholars have similarly lamented this judicial tendency to legitimize
regressive stereotypes in legal contexts outside employment discrimination. See
id. at 91 (observing that “the court regret[ted] the fact that women are chattel
within marriage and yet lock[ed] them firmly into the position of chattel by
substituting constitutional morality with codes of public morality,” with regard to
a case in which the Supreme Court upheld a statutory provision that empowered
men, but not women, to prosecute those who committed adultery with their
spouses).
134 See Air India Cabin Crew Ass’n v. Yeshawinee Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C.
187 (India). Interestingly enough, Air India discarded its discriminatory system of
classification in 2005 in response to a legislative directive to the effect that the
differential retirement ages for men and women should be eliminated. It then had
to fight to defend this decision in the courts, as male members of the cabin crew
challenged a new provision that permitted women to serve in supervisory
capacities. In 2011, the Supreme Court upheld Air India’s decision to implement
gender-neutral terms of employment, ending once and for all the airhostesses’
long and hard-fought battle for equality (on paper, at least). See Sankaran &
Madhav, supra note 108, and Zoe Li, Air India Operates (Almost) All-Female Flights,
CNN TRAVEL (Mar. 8, 2012), http://travel.cnn.com/mumbai/visit/air-indiaoperates-almost-all-female-flights-868673.
135 See, e.g., Javed v. Haryana, AIR 2003 S.C. 3057 (India) (failing to consider
the unequal burden on women imposed by a state ban on serving in public office
after having more than two children).
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equality should be applied only as a secondary approach, after
having established that the relevant parties are in fact
meaningfully similarly situated, such that application of formal
equality will not merely overlook existing structures of
subordination.
A more effective approach to substantive equality in Nergesh
Meerza and Yeshawinee Merchant would have more closely
examined the ways in which the collective bargaining process
operates to the disadvantage of the airhostesses. Factors such as
the relative bargaining power of the airhostesses within the union
and the possibility that the same gendered expectations that
originally led Air India to create separate male and female cadres
might impose limitations on the airhostesses’ ability to
meaningfully negotiate would be relevant to this inquiry.136
Formal equality should be limited to cases where the relevant
parties are employed in similar positions and are similarly situated
in terms of their relative advantage or disadvantage. In a
hierarchical employment context in which women and members of
the scheduled and backward classes are routinely assigned
subordinate positions and inferior terms of employment, it may
well be that members of these groups are not similarly situated
relative to more-advantaged employees such that application of
formal equality would yield satisfactory results.
6.

CONCLUSION

India’s approach to substantive equality has only been
modestly successful in alleviating the deep-seated structural
problems that facilitate discrimination in employment.
The
existing system addresses only isolated aspects of the problem
because it primarily rests on a system of quotas that pertain only to
the public sector and because it does not incorporate a
comprehensive statutory scheme that addresses intended and
unintended discrimination in its various forms and against a full
range of disadvantaged groups.
The Legislature’s failure to take decisive action to address
discrimination in the workplace has exacerbated the problem. The
employment discrimination framework remains extremely

136 For an analysis of the inadequate consideration given by trade unions to
the interests of women and other disadvantaged groups, see Hensman, supra note
108.
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fractured, and the rights of the scheduled and backward castes and
women are neglected. This inaction has forced the judiciary to take
on an extremely activist posture to protect the rights of the
disadvantaged, a circumstance that could prove problematic in
However, in the absence of effective
certain situations.137
legislative policy, the judiciary should continue to further the cause
of substantive equality in the manner employed in Vishaka.138 This
kind of activism on the part of the Court may provide interim relief
and serve the purpose of prodding the legislature into fulfilling its
part in upholding substantive equality.
In interpreting the State’s guarantees of equality, the judiciary
should apply a primarily substantive approach that is free from the
regressive effects of traditional values and norms. Formal equality
should be applied as a secondary framework, after establishing
that the relevant parties are similarly situated in terms of their
levels of (dis)advantage, such that the application of formal
equality principles will not perpetuate existing social hierarchies.
A more robust substantive equality of opportunity will, hopefully,
be a step towards eradicating the structures of subordination that
operate as barriers to advancement in all spheres of life.

137 See Sood, supra note 17, at 847–48 (highlighting the dangers of judicial
overreaching, including lack of accountability on the part of judges and the
potential loss of credibility that could result from the judiciary venturing into
policy matters beyond its competence).
138 Id. at 846 (underscoring the importance of judicial activism in India, given
the severity of inequality in this context and the possibility that people may resort
to extra-legal remedies in the absence of judicial recourse).
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